2013-02-01

EMP bomb could throw USA into stone age #WWIII #zombie #apocalypse

1.8: pol/purges/wwIII/emp
2.1: summary:
. here is the military's report on EMP threats,
where a single nuke miles above USA
creates a magnetic wave so powerful,
that the currents it induces in wires
will fry all our computers except military,
and could erase all data on hard drives .
. history has shown that when the power goes out
the crime wave is proportional to the outage's extent .
. we could be eaten alive by the mobs
before our enemies even set foot on our space .
. the worst part is our utter reliance on electricity
for pumping our water and fuel .
. without water and sanitation,
we will quickly be visited by epidemic disease .

1.8: news:
heritage.org 2010:
This is a Backgrounder On National Security and Defense
EMP Attacks—What the U.S. Must Do Now
By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Richard Weitz, Ph.D.
November 17, 2010
Most Americans—whether members of the public
or politicians in Congress—ignore or are unaware
of the very real threat
of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.
A nuclear device detonated high in the atmosphere
when centered over the American mainland
can easily disable the entire country’s electrical grid
—shutting down nearly all communications, transportation,
and service systems.
Overnight, daily life as Americans know it
will be a thing of the past.
There are ways to prevent devastation from an EMP
— and the U.S. must invest in them now before it is too late.
Two of the country’s preeminent national security experts
explain how to prevent the worst.

An electromagnetic pulse consists of three components:
E1 is a free-field energy pulse
that occurs in a fraction of a second.
The generated “electromagnetic shock”
then damages, disrupts, and destroys
electronics and electronic systems
in a near simultaneous time frame
over a very large area.
Faraday cage protection and other mechanisms
designed to defend against lighting strikes
will not withstand this assault.
Only specialized technology integrated into equipment
can harden it against EMP.
If the electromagnetic distortion is large enough,
the E1 shock will even destroy lightly EMP-shielded equipment
in addition to most consumer electronics.[2]
Devices that incorporate antennas
by nature accept electronic signals
and cannot be shielded against E1,
meaning trillions of dollars worth of electronics
will fail after an EMP assault,
regardless of protective measures.
E1 is also particularly worrisome because
it destroys Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition components
that are critical to many of our
national infrastructures.[3]
E2 covers essentially the same area as E1
but is more geographically widespread
and has lower amplitude than E1.
The E2 component has similar effects as lightning.
In general,
it would not be a critical threat to infrastructure,
since most systems have built-in protection against
occasional lightning strikes.
The E2 threat compounds that of the E1 component
since it strikes a fraction of a second
after the E1 has very likely damaged or destroyed
the protective devices that would have
prevented E2 damage.
The syncretistic effects mean that
E2 typically inflicts more damage than E1
since it bypasses traditional protective measures,
vastly amplifying the damage inflicted by EMP.[4]
E3 is a longer duration pulse, lasting up to one minute.
It disrupts long electricity transmission lines
and subsequently causes damage to the electrical supply
and distribution systems connected to these lines.
This E3 element of EMP is not a freely propagating wave,
but is a result of the electromagnetic distortion
in the earth’s atmosphere.
In this regard, E3 is similar to a massive geomagnetic storm,
and is particularly damaging to long-line infrastructure,
such as electrical cables and transformers.
A moderate blast of E3 reportedly could directly affect up to
70 percent of the U.S. power grid.[5]
The timing of the three components
is an important part of the equation
in relation to the damage that EMP generates.
The damage from each strike
amplifies the damage caused by each succeeding strike.
The combination of the three components
can cause irreversible damage to many electronic systems.
With the combined damage from earlier E1 and E2 blasts,
E3 has the potential to destroy the nation’s electrical grid
and thus inflict catastrophic damage on the United States.[6]

GPS and other satellite-dependent devices damaged:
. Both line-of-sight exposure and residual radiation
will degrade satellite performance after an EMP attack.
The x-rays, gamma rays, and UV radiation
emitted during a nuclear explosion
will propagate in outer space
and affect the performance of satellites
within line-of-sight exposure,
which is a significant amount of Earth’s orbit.
Moreover, the Earth’s magnetic field could act as a container
to trap energetic electrons
and form a radiation belt that would encircle the Earth.[37]
Both of these effects will degrade satellite performance.
most at risk are old satellites that have been
exposed to previous cosmic radiation,
satellites in low orbit,
and new satellites that are faster and lighter .

The most effective altitude is above the visible horizon.
If detonation is too low,
most of the electro-magnetic force from the EMP
will be driven into the ground,
while also creating deadly nuclear fallout .

In general, the further from the epicenter,
the weaker the EMP effects.
Yield is another factor to consider.
The higher the yield, the greater the effect.
Even so, since the effects travel through
electric lines and waterways,
and have secondary spill-over impacts on other infrastructure,
it is difficult to predict the possible extent of damage .

the Commission to Assess the
Threat from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack,
chaired by Dr. William R. Graham,
specific areas of analysis have included:
The Graham commission’s bottom line
is that an EMP attack will put an end to
the functioning of the U.S. electrical infrastructure
and much of the hardware that runs everyday life.
Airplanes would literally fall from the sky,
cars and trucks would stop working,
and even water supplies would fail.
. medical services would collapse
when they were needed most .

Ensuring a resilient U.S.–Canadian power grid is vital.[21]
An essential component of mitigating the threat must be
an early warning system,
system-situational awareness,
and robust command and control to ensure
cooperation between government agencies
and private companies during a crisis.

. much of the backbone of communication networks
are often located or housed in facilities that are
designed to protect this equipment from
EMP effects or lightning,
so there is some built-in industry protection
in these areas.[32]
. fiber optic cable is resistant to E1 attacks
as the backbone of the wireline infrastructure
has given this industry
significant protection from EMP shock.

. the global scope of shortwave radio
make it extremely likely that radio communications
will continue to function.
Ham radios and other communication devices themselves
may be destroyed, but the infrastructure itself
is nearly invulnerable.
Using radio or other means-assured emergency broadcasts
as well as interactive communications will be essential.

important to-do list for handling EMP threats:
    Prevent the threat.
pursue an aggressive protect-and-defend strategy,
including comprehensive missile defense;
modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent;
and adopting proactive nonproliferation
and counterproliferation measures,
both unilaterally and in partnership with allies.
    Provide resilience.
developing limited redundancy
and identifying means for the timely replacement
of essential damaged parts or their rapid substitution.
    Plan for the unthinkable.
The U.S. must have robust pre-disaster planning
—with practical exercises that include rehearsing
a wide variety of contingency scenarios—
that integrates federal, state, local, private-sector,
non-governmental organizations, and international support.
    Protect the capacity to communicate.
The U.S. must have the means to establish
assured emergency broadcast
as well as interactive communications
both within the U.S. and across the globe.
An EMP strike can easily obliterate
America’s electrical, telecommunications, transportation,
financial, food, and water infrastructures,
rendering the United States helpless to coordinate actions
and deliver services essential for daily life.
In the words of Arizona Senator Jon Kyl,
EMP “is one of only a few ways that the United States
could be defeated by its enemies.”[48]
The time to prepare is now.
refs:
empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf
“High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices:
Threat Assessments,” Congressional Research Service Report
fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32544.pdf
[37]J. A. Van Allen and L. A. Frank,
“Radiation Around the Earth
to a Radial Distance of 107,400 KM,”
Nature, Vol. 183 (February 14, 1959), p. 433.
[38]Foster et al.,
“Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat
to the United States from EMP Attack,” p. 163.
1.8: news:
The EMP would permanently destroy most computers
at the joint task force headquarters
and at the combined air operations center;
it would wipe clean critical magnetically stored data.

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) safe rooms

The Safe Cell is a portable, positive pressure
emergency air filtration system
designed to overpressure protected spaces such as
bomb shelters, and safe rooms
to provide collective protection during and after
a nuclear, biological, or chemical event.
It features a filter bank that is designed to protect against
all known airborne toxins including nuclear fallout,
radioactive iodine, weaponized biological carcinogens,
and warfare gases such as sarin, VX, and tabun.
The entire system has been designed to meet
the critical requirements in the
United States Army Corps of Engineers
Technical Letter ETL 1110-3-498.
EMP Commission report, page 131:
. We tested a sample of 37 cars
in an EMP simulation laboratory,
with automobile vintages ranging from 1986 through 2002.
Automobiles of these vintages include extensive electronics
and represent a significant fraction of
automobiles on the road today.
The testing was conducted by exposing automobiles to
sequentially increasing EMP field intensities.
If anomalous response [either temporary or permanent]
was observed,
the testing of that particular automobile was stopped.
If no anomalous response was observed,
the testing was continued up to the field intensity limits of the
simulation capability [approximately 50 kV/m].

Automobiles were subjected to EMP environments under both
engine turned off and engine turned on conditions.
No effects were subsequently observed in those automobiles
that were not turned on during EMP exposure.
The most serious effect observed on running automobiles
was that the motors in three cars stopped at
field strengths of approximately 30 kV/m or above.

. the strength of the electrical spike
induced in any electrical device by a HEMP burst
is dependent on the length and physical orientation
of any conductors connected to the device.
Long conductors [i.e., AC power lines,
phone lines, big antennas, etc.]
receive a significant amount of the EM pulse;
short conductors do not.

MIL-STD-188-125-1:

High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection
for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical,
Time-Urgent Missions Part 1: Fixed Facilities
17 July 1998,
EMP Shielded Volume (Shielded Cabinet or enclosure)
for the mission essential equipment (MEE)
vulnerable to EMP such as the radios.

Structural T2 Conductive Composite Hull:

RADIUS ENGINEERING INT'L INC.,®
11551 CR 314, Terrell, TX 972-552-2484
for HEMP Weapons, Nuclear Weapons .
. CAT 25 is a totally self-contained
40 psi structural T2 Conductive Composite
multiple elliptical torrid underground disaster shelter
designed to protect 25 adults for long periods
or 50 people for short durations such as during tornadoes.
The product was specifically designed and developed
to protect people during and after disasters such as
tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, storms, forest fires,
power failures, nuclear power plant accidents,
nuclear/chemical terrorism, HEMP attack
and full-scale protracted nuclear, chemical and biological war.
CAT 25 is a third generation disaster shelter
designed and developed by Walton W. McCarthy, M.E.,
author of
PRINCIPLES of PROTECTION, U.S. Handbook of
NBC Weapon Fundamentals
and Shelter Engineering Standards,
Fifth Edition, 2002,
which is the United State’s bible on shelter engineering.

EMP PROTECTION- CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS

A simple and reliable approach to making sure that
the minimum essential equipment (MEE) or radios
are protected in the shelter
with no testing or maintenance requirements
is to simply not have the radios connected
and/or have backup radios.
Since civilians would not normally be in the shelter
prior to an EMP event,
the radios can be turned on and the antennas erected
after the shelter is entered.
If MEE operation is required for a second or third EMP event,
a small EMP vault (optional)
can be used to store radios, circuit boards,
other electronic back-up parts.
The Radius shelters are off grid with internal generators
so they are not subject to EMP collected on the power grid.
The critical equipment in the Radius shelters
that are NOT subject to EMP
are the Sewage Lift Station-submersible pump,
water well submersible pump,
internal diesel generator with internal tank,
air blower, lights, electric stove,
hand crank generator,
DVD player, and television.

EMP PROTECTION - MIL-STD-188-125-1 MILITARY APPLICATIONS

(not recommended for civilian applications)
EMP protection is required for
electronic equipment not people!
The only equipment in the Radius shelters subject to EMP
are the Radios.
Radius shelters are manufactured with
the T2 Conductive Composite.
The shelter is designed to meet MIL-STD-188-125-1
but has not yet completed
the required testing by the US Government.
The vacuum infused composite hull is conductive
providing excellent EMP shielding without corrosion problems.
As with any conductive hull,
there is not a 100% discharge of the EMP energy
to the ground surrounding the hull:
Some is discharged inside the shelter.
Therefore, for military customers requiring
an underground shelter to meet MIL-STD-188-125-1:
"High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection
for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical,
Time-Urgent Missions Part 1: Fixed Facilities" 17 July 1998,
the shelter should be equipped with the optional
EMP Shielded Volume (Shielded Cabinet or enclosure)
for the mission essential equipment (MEE)
vulnerable to EMP such as the radios.
The EMP shielded enclosure is a
wall mounted aluminum cabinet with a hinged door.
This cabinet is used for active MEE or radio operation
before, during, and after an EMP event.
This is necessary for military personnel who are
already stationed in the field.
This standard requires the radios to be powered in the cabinet,
the antennas to be connected to the radios in the cabinet
and the antennas are erected.
The shielded cabinet has shielded penetrations
for the incoming power
and shielded penetrations for antenna cables
for three radios, the scanner, HAM, and one spare.
Special air blowers are used inside the cabinet
to cool the radios.
Certification to MIL-STD -188-125-1
requires that the shelter pass a US Government testing procedure.
Secondly, after the shelter installation,
this standard requires monthly on-site testing
by technicians with special equipment
testing seams, point of entries (POE), doors, ducts, etc.
and constant maintenance.
With internal generators as the only source of power,
there is no risk in the shelter
of an EMP induced current overload
from being connected to the public power grid.
The power cable from the shelter to the dedicated well
and the well water hose to the shelter
are both underground and shielded.
All of the Radius shelter models have been
reviewed for an EMP Protection Analysis
by a Certified Electromagnetic Compatibility Engineer
and a Certified Electrostatic Discharge Control Engineer
and found to comply with MIL-STD-188-125-1
with a shielded enclosure for MEE.

Carlo Kopp`Hardening Your Computing Assets:

. High power attack by bombs of the
flux generator or microwave type
is as likely as WWIII .
Low power attacks requiring fewer resources
include HERF gun, disruption of mains power supplies
and Tazer attack on business local networks .

Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010:

Colin R. Miller, Major, USAF
Center for Strategy and Technology
Air War College, Air University
325 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB Alabama 36112-6427
November 2005
CHAPTER 12
Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010
Electronic Circuit Vulnerability to EMP:
Electromagnetic pulses damage both
electrical and electronic circuits
by inducing voltages and currents
that they are not designed to withstand.
To see how this occurs,
it is necessary to understand both
the characteristics of electromagnetic pulses
and the circuits they offend.
An electromagnetic pulse is defined by its
rise time (volts/second),
(time need to reach peak amplitude)
its electrical field strength (volts/meter (v/m),
and its frequency content (Hertz [Hz]). 6
These factors combine to determine
the threat EMP poses to a given system.
Rise time is primarily a factor for protected systems,
such as those employing surge protectors.
When rise times are less than
a few thousandths of a second,
protection circuitry often cannot react in time. 7
Field strength defines the amount of
energy available to transfer to the target system,
and frequency determines
the efficiency of that transfer.
Electric field orientation is also critical .
EMPs are typified by fast rise times,
high field strengths,
and broad frequency content
— it's the combining of these factors
that makes them lethal .
EMP induce large voltage and current transients
on electrical conductors such as antennas and wires
as well as conductive tracks on electronic circuit boards.8
When pulses enter a system through a path designed to
gather electromagnetic energy, such as an antenna,
they are said to have entered through the “front door.”
In contrast, when they enter through an unplanned path,
such as cracks, seems, trailing wires or conduits,
they have entered through the “back door.” 9
The efficiency of the energy transfer from pulse to system
depends upon the frequency compatibility
between the pulse and the entry path
and on the conductivity of the material.
When system characteristics match that
of the offending EMP pulse,
higher levels of damage occur.
In general,
integrated circuits with short signal paths
are susceptible to high frequency pulses
while large electrical systems,
such as commercial power characterized by
long transmission lines,
are vulnerable to low frequency EMP.
It follows that a broadband EMP weapon
threatens a greater number of systems
than a narrowband weapon,
though the power requirement for a broadband weapon
is much higher.
Regardless of how EMP enters a system,
it damages components simply by overloading them.
For example, high density MOS computer chips,
which rely on extremely narrow internal “wires”
to connect densely packed components,
are permanently damaged when exposed to
more than tens of volts or a few tenths of an amp. 10
. for the minimum field strength required to
induce signals of this magnitude,
testing has shown that pulses of 10 kV/m
are sufficient to cause widespread damage. 11
Ten kV/m could induce electrical charges that are
a billion times more powerful than systems were designed for,
not just burning them out,
but in some cases melting critical components. 12
As a result,
unhardened computers used in data processing,
communications systems, displays,
industrial controls, military systems
(including signal processors
and electronic engine and flight control systems),
telecommunications equipment, radar, satellites,
UHF, VHF, HF, and television equipment
are all vulnerable to the EMP at and above this level. 13

III. EMP Weapons

EMP weapons come in a variety of forms,
differing in cost, complexity,
and lethality to electronic systems.
Regardless of the type, they offer the user
many significant advantages.
First,
EMP weapons do not rely on in-depth knowledge
of the systems they strike,
attacking all electronic systems without prejudice.
Second,
they are effective in all weather.
Third,
they are area weapons, with scalable footprints.
One weapon can kill electronic systems
in an area the size of a tennis court
or throughout the entire United States. 14
Fourth,
they produce persistent and lasting effects
through destruction of circuits.
Fifth,
to counter EMP, entire systems must be hardened
from end-to-end, a costly defense effort.
Sixth,
and perhaps most importantly,
EMP weapons don’t hurt people directly.
an adversary could potentially decimate
U.S. war-making capability
without inflicting casualties,
thus minimizing potential political repercussions. 15
. EMP weapons can be classified as
nuclear, high power microwave (HPM),
or electromagnetic bomb (e-bomb).
Each has its own characteristics,
but all are constrained by the fact that
they need a clear line-of-sight to the target to be effective.

  Nuclear High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)

Nuclear devices that generate HEMP
are the most sophisticated, expensive,
and effective electromagnetic weapons.
The U.S. military first witnessed their effects
after a series of high-altitude nuclear tests
on Johnston Atoll in 1962.
These tests unexpectedly generated disruptions in
electronic systems in Hawaii, over 1000 miles away,
due to EMP effects.
Electronic systems failed across the island,
radio broadcasts were interrupted, streetlights burned out,
and burglar alarms sounded. 16
The Soviets had similar experiences,
damaging overhead and underground cables
at distances of 400 miles from low yield (300 kiloton)
high altitude nuclear tests. 17
HEMP is generated as a side effect of
high-altitude nuclear detonation's
interaction with the atmosphere.
Gamma rays released by the explosion
producing through Compton scattering
high-energy free electrons that are then
trapped in the earth’s magnetic field,
generating an oscillating electric current,
which gives rise to a rapidly radiating
coherent electromagnetic pulse.
The pulse can span continent-sized areas,
due to the vast line of sight provide by its altitude,
and affect systems on land, sea, and air. 18

Characteristics

The HEMP is composed of three components.
E1 is a high frequency (1 MHz-1 GHz) free-field energy pulse
with a rise time of a few billionths of a second. 19
This component can damage electronics-based
computer systems, sensors, and communications systems .
. E2 is a medium frequency pulse,
similar to lightning,
that follows E1 by a few millionths of a second.
The E2 component doesn't get past surge protectors
especially those hardened against lightning
but the E1 pulse damages surge protectors .
E3 is 3-30 Hz, slower rising pulse
that follows E2 by a couple thousandths of a second
and creates disruptive currents in long transmission lines. 20
The sequence of E1, E2, and E3 is important,
because each causes damage
building on the preceding pulse. 21
The strength of HEMP depends on the
design and yield of the nuclear device.
However, a mere 1 or 2 megaton device
detonated at an altitude of 250 miles
would produce a field strength of 10-50 kV/m,
enough to produce extensive damage to electronics
over the entire continental U.S. 22
This illustrates the most significant
characteristic of HEMP:
one or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations
can cause widespread damage due to its
high power, wide coverage, and broad bandwidth.

Proliferation

Generating HEMP is very difficult and expensive
because it requires the ability to field both a nuclear weapon
and a delivery system to get it to altitude.
It is critical to note that HEMP
occurs for nuclear detonations above 25 miles
and is most effective above approximately 70 miles.
The higher the burst is,
the more widespread the effects due to line of sight. 23
Currently,
the United States, Russia, United Kingdom,
France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel
have the capability to produce HEMP, 11
and other countries are not far behind,
either due to indigenous weapons programs
or arms trading. 24
More than 128,000 nuclear warheads
have been built worldwide since 1945,
and many are unaccounted for. 25
In addition,
over 10,000 missiles owned by 30 countries
are capable of lifting a nuclear weapon
over U.S. expeditionary forces. 26
Of particular concern is North Korea,
which recently declared ownership of nuclear weapons
and has a robust short and intermediate range
ballistic missile program with many fielded systems.

High Power Microwaves:

While EMP is usually associated with nuclear weapons,
it can also be generated though non-nuclear means.
High power microwave (HPM) weapons
encompass a class of directed-energy devices
that emit electromagnetic energy at high frequencies.
By changing the power, frequency,
and distance to the target,
HPM weapons can produce effects that range from
denying the use of electrical equipment
to disrupting, damaging, or destroying it. 27
HPM weapons are in their infancy
and demand a strong technology base for acquisition.
The biggest challenges involve
being small enough to be tactically useful
while generating sufficient power levels
to affect targets from sufficient standoff range
and developing ultra-wideband antennas
for certain systems. 28,29
. HPM operate predominantly in the
1 MHz to 1 GHz frequency range, occasionally higher,
and may operate in very narrow bandwidths.
They are capable of very short rise times
(on the order of a few billionths of a second)
and in this way are similar to HEMP.
In addition,
HPM systems can be tailored to generate area effects
or to restrict influence to small geographic areas or systems,
such as individual aircraft or vehicles. 30
Current systems generate power densities
of 0.1 .. 100 watts/square meter (w/m2) at the target,
which corresponds to an electrical field strength
between 5 ... 200 v/m. 31
This power level is well below the
10 kV/m required to guarantee circuit destruction. 32
The lower power can be a limitation
but also provides the benefit of scalable effects.
HPM, due to their high frequency,
are inherently suited to attack any
modern system such as for military command and control
built on integrated circuits or relay switches .

The United States is a world leader in
the development of HPM weapons
and is still a few years away from fielding a system
capable of inflicting electronic casualties.
Other countries known to have purchased
or to be developing HPM for military purposes
include Australia, UK, Russia, and Sweden. 34

Electromagnetic Bombs:

Electromagnetic bombs offer another non-nuclear method.
E-bombs may be differentiated from HPM
by the fact that they use conventional explosives
to destroy a pre-charged electric circuit
in a way that produces a desired electromagnetic wave.
Since they destroy themselves to generate the pulse,
they are inherently single-use devices
suited to projectile munitions or suitcase bombs.
Two versions of the e-bomb are
the explosively pumped coaxial
flux compression generator (FCG)
and the virtual cathode oscillator (vircator).

FCG and Vircator Characteristics:

The explosively pumped FCG
is among the most mature e-bomb technologies,
being first investigated by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
in the early 1950s.
The main idea behind the FCG
is rapidly compressing a magnetic field,
transferring the energy from an explosion into an EMP. 35
A typical design involves
wrapping an electrical coil around a conductive sleeve,
which then surrounds a shaped explosive charge.
An instant before the detonation,
the coil is energized via a capacitor bank or smaller FCG
with about 1 million amps of electric current,
which generates an enormous, rapidly decaying EM field.
The sophisticated explosive then detonates
from one end of the coil to the other,
distorting the conductive sleeve
and creating a traveling short circuit
that collapses the electromagnetic field
into a narrow wave front.
Published results indicate rise times between
10 and a few hundred 391millionths of a second,
and peak energy output near 10 megaJoules,
which equates to a field strength of 1 kV/m
at a range of 1 mile. 36
If the FCG were loaded on a projectile
and detonated within 175 meters of the target,
the field strength would increase to 10 kV/m2,
ensuring massive electronic circuit destruction.
FCG pulse frequencies are low, typically below 1 MHz,
which makes them less likely than HPM-type weapons
to enter systems through the “front door”
or to damage integrated circuits and circuit boards directly,
as most electronic systems
aren’t vulnerable to EMP below 200 MHz. 37
However, these pulses may enter through the back door
and induce malicious currents in some systems.
While FCGs are relatively simple and technically viable,
their inherent low frequency limits their effectiveness
against many targets.
The vircator, in contrast,
can produce a more lethal high frequency pulse
while maintaining the low physical profile
required for packaging in a projectile or bomb.
The physics behind a vircator
are significantly more complex than the FCG.
The device accelerates a high current electron beam
against a foil anode,
developing a space charge region
that oscillates at microwave frequencies.
The charge region is placed in a tuned resonant cavity,
producing very high power levels.
The shape of the resonant cavity is then
instantly changed via an explosive charge
(usually from a cylinder to a horn).
The horn acts as an antenna and radiates an
electromagnetic pulse of up to 40 gigawatts
at frequencies between 1 and 10 GHz. 38
If one assumes a semi-isotropic antenna pattern,
a vircator could generate a high frequency pulse
with a field strength of 900 v/m at a
range of 1 mile, or 10 kV/m at 150 meters.

Proliferation:

Open literature suggests that
e-bombs are easy to build
that they will undoubtedly find their way
into the hands of terrorists in the very near term.
One source even provides the design of a FCG
that it claims can be built for under $400. 39
While it is true that the component parts are cheap,
assembling a working device is not trivial.
Challenges include
generating high power levels to charge the coil,
timing excitement of the coil with detonation,
and shaping the charge to detonate in a
precise geometric manner.
Still, an FCG is among the most likely EMP weapons
to be used against the U.S. in the near term.
Vircators, on the other hand,
require a rather significant technology base for development.
Countries known to be working on them
include the United States and Australia. 40
However, any country that relies primarily on
information technology
to sustain its economy is probably capable of fielding one,
and once fielded, they could proliferate rapidly,
since safeguards employed to
control weapons lethal to humans may not be used.
Indeed, evidence suggests that
e-bombs are already proliferating.
A 1998 newspaper article claimed that
the Swedish National Defense Research Institute
purchased a Russian “suitcase bomb” for $100,000
that uses electromagnetic waves
to destroy all electronics within its “blast radius.” 41

IV. 2010 EMP Threat Assessment and Scenarios:

A significant amount of open-source literature
proclaims that the sky is falling regarding EMP,
primarily because the United States is becoming
increasingly reliant on computers and information systems
for its vitality and defense
while systems that generate EMP are proliferating.

The most likely threat was use of an
explosively pumped flux compression generator,
and the most dangerous was nuclear high altitude EMP.
Though the threat of EMP existed during the Cold War,
the probability was considerably higher in 2010,
as illustrated by the following plausible scenarios.
Note:
year-2010 HPM systems did’t generate enough power
to guarantee destruction of most integrated circuits. 42

Scenario #1: China Isolates Taiwan:

According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense,
China’s electronic and information warfare capabilities
will pose a real threat to Taiwan by 2010,
as China becomes more proficient
in using electromagnetic pulse bombs
to paralyze Taiwan’s command systems. 43
According to a white paper
released by the Taiwanese government in 2002,
Taiwan’s capacity to endure the ravages of war
is extremely limited.
It will have to take offensive action
in the form of a decisive naval and air battle
to prevent mainland troops
from landing on the island. 44
This battle would probably involve joint U.S. forces,
as the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act
pledges to “resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security,
or the social or economic system
of the people of Taiwan.” 45
Indeed, the United States responded promptly in 1996
with a build up of forces when Taiwan was threatened.
For its part,
USA will rely heavily on information superiority
and network-centric operations
to meet its Pacific commitments in 2010.
According to Admiral Fargo,
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Commander,
USPACOM forces will exploit [informational] asymmetries
for “significantly greater military capability”
at lower personnel levels” through
command, control, communications, computers,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture. 46

At dawn on Easter morning,
Chinese special operations forces
detonate a series of hand-carried
flux compression generators
near unprotected power transmission stations
on the island of Taiwan.
High energy, low frequency EMP
couples with power transmission lines
and overloads transformers,
causing power failures at key air and missile defense sites.
China immediately follows the attack
with a salvo of CSS-6 GPS-guided
intermediate range ballistic missiles,
each carrying multiple conventional vircators. 47
The vircators detonate at precise locations
above critical strategic targets,
decimating computer-based systems
with incredibly high power levels and small footprints,
minimizing collateral damage.
The attack destroys Taiwan’s military's
command, control, and communications system
and disrupts civil telecommunications,
leaving the country in a communications blackout.
The second wave of vircators
immobilizes Taiwan’s key defensive systems,
including its high-tech F-16 fighters,
air defense radars, and missile systems.

Meanwhile, China launches a separate EMP attack
against the USS Enterprise carrier battle group,
cruising in the Straits of Formosa.
The attack involves a simultaneous wave of
hundreds of air launched decoys intermixed with
stealthy vircator-carrying cruise missiles.
A few of the vircators get close enough to
blast highly sensitive radar and communications antennas
with high frequency EMP, blinding and segregating the fleet.
The attack also affects key kinetic systems,
grounding a large percentage of F-18 fighters
and immobilizing radar-guided fleet defense missiles.
Some airborne pilots are forced to bail out
as their flight control computers fail.

Within an hour of such an attack,
U.S. and Taiwanese forces would be
unable to repel any Chinese follow-on invasion,
much less wage an offensive.
At the same time, U.S. leadership, half a world away,
would have little information
and little time to order a response,
and the event would expose America’s Achilles’ heel
for the world to see.
Crippled U.S. naval forces would have to limp home,
while other similarly vulnerable forces
hurriedly deploy to relieve them.

Scenario #2: North Korea Levels the Playing Field:

After World War II, a republic was set up
in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula
while a communist-style government
was installed in the north.
During the Korean War (1950-1953),
U.S. and other United Nations forces intervened
to defend South Korea from North Korean attacks.
An armistice signed in 1953 split
the country in half at the 38th parallel.
Since then,
South Korea has undergone a technological revolution,
which has driven economic growth
18 times that of North Korea,
which has descended into poverty. 48
but, North Korea has vast conventional forces,
declared nuclear weapons,
and has the resolve to wage full-scale war
against both South Korea and the United States. 49

The United States and South Korea
operate under the terms of the 1954
Republic of Korea-USA Mutual Defense Treaty,
which binds both parties to defend each other.
As part of this commitment,
the U.S. maintains approximately
45,000 troops in South Korea
with plans to reinforce them with up to 640,000 more,
predominantly from USPACOM. 50
These troops, and their U.S.-equipped
South Korean counterparts,
represent a high-tech electronic force
that relies on information superiority
to overcome the larger North Korean army.

In March 2000 General Thomas Schwartz,
then the U.S. commander in Korea,
testified at a congressional hearing,
"North Korea is the country most likely
to involve the United States in a large-scale war." 51
North Korea has made it clear that it will
strike all U.S. targets with all means
if the U.S. strikes first.
According to a Korean defense expert,
North Korea plans to win without outside assistance
through a massive conventional warfare campaign
involving tactical aircraft,
600 high-speed landing craft, 140 hovercraft,
3,000 pontoon bridges, 700,000 troops, 8,000 heavy guns,
and 2,000 tanks placed in more than
4,000 hardened bunkers within 150 km of the DMZ.
North Korea plans to supplement this campaign with
weapons of mass destruction. 52

. suppose tensions have increased
between the USA and North Korea
over the latter’s nuclear weapons program.
Now in the open,
the U.S. has learned that North Korea
has many more weapons than feared,
and recent intelligence indicates
that they have sold at least one complete weapon
to a terrorist organization.
In response, USA imposes sanctions on North Korea,
builds up its troop strength on the peninsula,
and deploys two carrier battle groups to the region.
With appropriate computerized mission planning tools in place
and all combined and joint forces
networked for dominant battlespace awareness
and blue force tracking,
the alliance is ready to strike.

Under the cover of darkness,
an all-stealth force of F/A-22s, F-117s, and B-2s
strikes North Korea’s nuclear production capability,
after which all aircrews return safely to base.
Six hours later, just before dawn,
an eerie red-orange glow covers the southern sky
as a North Korean Taepodong missile,
carrying a small nuclear weapon,
detonates high above the peninsula’s southern tip.
Minutes later, a vast conventional North Korean force
emerges from hiding places underground
and invades the south.
Even a small, relatively crude nuclear device
detonated above the Korean peninsula
would generate an EMP well above 10 kV/m,
ensuring wholesale destruction
of unprotected electronic systems. 53
The first-order effect on coalition forces
would be a command, control, and communications (C3) blackout.

The EMP would permanently destroy
most computers and displays
at the joint task force headquarters
and combined air operations center
and would wipe clean
critical magnetically stored data.
Radio, satellite, and cell phone
communications would be permanently shut down,
as well as wireline telephone systems
relying on microprocessor control. 54
The second order effect would be damage
or destruction of major combat systems.
Fielded forces would probably realize
that something bad was happening
but would have no way to access
information and command systems
to develop situational awareness
and execute a response.
The EMP would severely degrade the
South Korean air defense system,
if it did not destroy it all together.
It would also immobilize unprotected vehicles
(commercial and military)
due to failures in electronic ignition systems
and/or computerized engine controls.
State-of-the-art aircraft such as the
F-16, F-117, and F/A-22
would crash due to failure of
fly-by-wire flight control systems
and full-authority digital engine controls,
and those on the ground would be inoperative.
The EMP would also affect ships at sea,
debilitating the critical early warning radars
as well as self-protection and offensive combat systems.
Third order effects would impact every
soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine.
This deadly shock to the network-centric
and digitally magnified Western combat force
would give North Korea a massive advantage
for at least three reasons.

First, North Korea would have achieved
both tactical surprise and information dominance.
Second, North Korean forces would likely be
less reliant on modern electronics for success,
allowing them to  withstand the EMP.
Third, having foreknowledge of the attack,
North Korea would be able to ensure
their critical electronic systems were protected
via sheltering, shielding,
and positioning of the nuclear detonation.

Scenario #3 EMP Attack on U.S. Homeland

On July 15, 1996, President Bill Clinton issued
executive order No. 13010,
which identified infrastructures critical to
the nation’s survival:
telecommunications, electrical power systems,
oil and gas storage, transportation,
banking and finance, water supply systems,
and emergency services. 55
Unfortunately, these critical infrastructures
were also singled out by a 2004 congressional report
as being vulnerable to EMP attack.
The report concluded that America’s reliance on electronics
makes “EMP one of a small number of threats
that can hold [US] society at risk of
catastrophic consequences.” 56
It went on to say that EMP damage to
electric power systems, telecommunications, energy,
and other infrastructures
could seriously impact the nation’s financial system,
means of getting food, water,
and medical care to the citizenry, trade,
and the production of goods and services.
This vulnerability will be increasingly attractive
as U.S. use of, and dependence on, electronics
continues to grow,
and nuclear weapons proliferate.
In the context of theater operations,
adversaries could use an EMP attack against the U.S. homeland
as either a deterrent to U.S. involvement
or as a preemptive strike to task saturate U.S. leadership
and focus U.S. forces at home.
Amazingly,
Vladimir Lukin, a member of the Russian Duma,
actually suggested such a course of action in 1999.
Mr. Lukin told Representative Bartlett,
who was part of a delegation sent to ease tensions with Russia
over U.S. involvement in the Balkans,
that if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States,
they would launch a missile from a submarine,
explode it high over the U.S.,
and shut down the U.S. power grid for six months. 57

U.S.-Russian relations cool dramatically by 2010
due to tensions over U.S. military presence
and action in the Caucuses.
The Russians demand U.S. expeditionary forces withdraw
within 72 hours or face dire consequences.
Seeing no significant Russian troop build up
in concert with the threat,
the U.S. calls Russia’s bluff,
while attempting to negotiate a settlement.
Twenty-four hours after the deadline,
a Russian “spy satellite”
explodes over the central United States,
releasing a high altitude electromagnetic pulse
that blankets the entire continent.
The effect of a HEMP attack on the continental U.S.
would be devastating,
causing several trillions of dollars of damage
in cascading failures within the infrastructure. 58
The primary avenue for destruction
would be through electrical power and telecommunications,
on which all other infrastructures,
including energy, transportation, banking and finance,
water, and emergency services,
The cumulative effect of infrastructure failures
would  effectively send the country back in time.

The majority of the US would be without electrical power.
Telephones, televisions, and radios would be inoperative,
and fuel/energy would be scarce.
Most cars would not work, and public transportation
— plane, rail, and bus, would be immobilized.
Banking and financial services would become unavailable,
and the amount in one’s wallet or purse
would define their liquid worth.
At the same time,
emergency services would have trouble functioning
and responding to the disaster.
The discussion below describes the most critical failures.

Electrical Power

The U.S. economy and functioning society
is critically dependent on electricity.
Fortunately, the electrical power system
is outstanding in its ability to
deliver relatively cheap, high-quality power .
At the same time, however,
the system has become increasingly fragile.
While demand for electrical power has
increased dramatically over the last decade,
little has been done to
upgrade power transmission systems.
At the same time,
the few power generation systems added to the grid
have been built at considerable distances
from load centers for environmental purposes.
The result is a system operating near peak capacity
to move power from generation to load.
The August 14, 2003 blackout
provides a clear example of system fragility.
At approximately 4:10 pm,
a power surge of approximately 3,500 MW
entered the New York power system. 60
Within seconds,
50 million North Americans found themselves without power,
and thousands of businesses had to close operations. 61
The blackout was a wake up call to American leadership
on the fragility of the infrastructure.
The effects of an HEMP-induced blackout
would be far more severe for at least three reasons.

First,
an HEMP attack would induce power surges
simultaneously over the entire continent,
degrading, in an instant, at least 70%
of the nation’s electrical service.
Second,
the late-time EMP component (E3)
would couple more efficiently to
long power transmission lines
than naturally occurring phenomenon do,
and thus would produce far more damage
than seen on August 14th.
Third,
the electrical power system requires
proper functioning communications, financial systems,
transportation, and fuel supply for operation,
all of which would also suffer damage from HEMP,
which would extend the recovery time
to a period of months or a year. 62

Telecommunications

Telecommunications are critical to
modern society’s function because
they enable other key infrastructures
like financial markets, transportation,
and energy distribution;
facilitate business and commerce;
provide personal convenience;
and allow for coordinated emergency response. 63
Fortunately,
efforts have been underway since 1985
to harden critical parts of the U.S.
telecommunications infrastructure from HEMP. 64
Its four major elements—wireline, wireless, satellite,
and radio—have overlapping capabilities
and different vulnerabilities to EMP.
After an attack,
some portion of the system would still be intact
but would be overloaded by massive call volume,
leading to significantly degraded service.
In anticipation, the U.S. government developed
national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
that guarantee government priority
on surviving telecommunications infrastructure.
An unfortunate side effect of NS/EP,
in the event of an HEMP attack,
is that most civilian users would be
locked out of the communications grid,
making disaster response problematic.
In many cases, authorities would have no way to
contact citizens and provide instructions. 65

Fuel/Energy

U.S. fuel and energy production
and distribution systems depend heavily on
electronic control systems
that use real-time data flows for operation
and use electronic sensors to monitor critical processes
and react quickly to malfunctions.
An EMP attack would fatally damage
at least some of these electronics,
causing ungraceful system shutdowns
resulting in extensive damage,
while providing an incomplete picture
for troubleshooting and repair.
Simultaneous failures in the
electrical and communications sectors
would also affect fuel and energy availability.
Electrical power needed to operate valves, pumps,
and other machinery required to deliver fuel
wouldn’t be available,
and communications needed to
coordinate activities at refineries
and ensure safety of on-site personnel
and the surrounding environment would be scarce. 66
In the end, the fuel and energy shortage
would probably persist for extended periods
while interrelated infrastructures were repaired.
Consequently, the U.S. could experience many casualties
due to exposure if the attack occurred in the winter.

Transportation

The U.S. transportation infrastructure
includes freight and commuter railroads,
commercial air, roadways, and waterways,
all of which are increasingly reliant on
information technology and public information networks. 67
The push to achieve superior performance has led to
tremendous reliance on electronics vulnerable to EMP.
Examples include
microprocessor-controlled internal combustion engines
and electronic tracking of freight shipments
outfitted with miniature radio frequency identification tags.
The Commission to Assess the Threat from EMP Attack
determined that significant degradation
of U.S. transportation infrastructure
would result from EMP attack.
In particular, municipal roads would experience gridlock,
traffic lights would fail,
and many autos would shut down permanently.
Railroad traffic would stop,
and commercial air traffic would cease operations
for safety reasons.
Similarly, ports would stop loading and unloading ships
until power and telecommunications infrastructures were restored. 68

Banking and Finance

Almost all U.S. economic activity
depends on proper functioning of the financial industry,
built on a foundation of electronic technologies.
Most financial transactions involved in
preserving and promoting national wealth,
as well as the preponderance of
personal and institutional transactions,
are performed and recorded electronically.
In addition, the financial system depends on
reliable and robust telecommunications
to coordinate interrelated business,
and electrical power to sustain operations. 69
The attacks of September 11, 2001
illustrated that disruption of critical infrastructures
has a direct effect on financial markets
and increases liquidity risks
for the United States financial system.
In response to this,
the Federal Reserve Board identified key functions
that require same-day recovery after an attack
to ensure viability of the U.S. financial system.
These functions included
large-value inter-bank funds transfer capability,
automated clearinghouse operations,
key clearinghouse settlement utilities, 40
1and treasury automated auction
and processing system operation. 70
Each of these systems and their underlying infrastructures
are potentially vulnerable to EMP.
If they fail for greater than 24 hours,
quite likely in this scenario,
the viability of the entire U.S. economy would be at risk.

Emergency Services

EMP attack would severely debilitate emergency services
required for adequate response,
primarily due to service reliance on
computer and communications equipment,
but also due to their reliance on electricity. 71
Emergency services are also critically dependent on transportation,
fuel for backup generators, and network equipment,
all debilitated by EMP as previously discussed.
Thus, emergency services represent
another critical infrastructure
in the chain of cascading failures
that would contribute to the growing catastrophe.

V. Recommendations and Conclusion

EMP poses a massive threat to U.S. theater operations
through its potential to isolate forces
and deny access to regions,
its ability to nullify the U.S. technology advantage,
and its potential to produce a devastating national catastrophe.
Even more ominous is the fact that
the means to produce EMP effects,
both nuclear and non-nuclear, are proliferating.
National leaders must face the looming EMP threat immediately
and develop measures that will reduce the likelihood of an EMP strike,
maintain the military advantage in the event of theater attack,
and increase the nation’s chance for surviving a homeland attack.
Through diplomacy, hardening of critical systems, training,
and the establishment of industry standards to ensure
future procurement of EMP-resilient systems,
America can prevail against one of the most serious near-term threats.

Diplomacy

The first step in mitigating the possibility
and consequence of EMP attack is deterrence.
Rather than avoiding the issue of EMP,
U.S. diplomats and senior leaders
should transmit an unambiguous message
about adversary use of EMP weapons.
Specifically, the U.S. should openly classify nuclear EMP
as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD),
due to its huge footprint and devastating effects.
Though nuclear EMP won’t harm humans directly
as long as they are kept clear of blast effects,
second-order consequences of a large-scale attack
would be overwhelming.
In addition, a homeland attack could threaten
the ability of U.S. leaders to govern
and would probably wreck the U.S. economy.
Therefore, the U.S. must make it known
that such an attack will be considered a WMD strike
and make it clear that the United States
would respond in kind.

Hardening of Military Systems

A subset of critical military systems must be hardened
to ensure survival in an EMP environment
to bolster the credibility of deterrence
and to ensure that the U.S. can meet
national and military objectives
at home and abroad even if attacked by EMP.
The two ways to protect electronic systems from EMP
both involve putting a physical electric shield
around vulnerable electronics.
The first method involves shielding the environment
in which the electronics operate
(such as an entire building),
while the second involves shielding individual circuits.

EMP Hardening Techniques

. when many essential devices are collocated,
the shielding their entire environment
is a cost-effective solution for EMP protection .
An air operations center (AOC)
provides a good example.
Incorporating a grounded metallic shield
into the building structure
and surge protecting power, communications, and antenna lines
could protect an entire AOC from EMP.
Mobile systems require a different means,
such as a Faraday cage,
which can protect individual components.
A Faraday cage is simply a metallic mesh
built around an electronic circuit
(such as a fighter aircraft flight control computer)
that protects it from EMP.
The cost of hardening systems against EMP in the design phase
is relatively inexpensive,
usually between 1% and 5% of system cost. 72
Unfortunately,
the U.S. has only hardened a portion of its strategic force
and virtually none of its tactical force. 73
Hardening systems after fielding
is significantly more expensive.
Making matters worse, U.S. forces are increasingly embracing
commercial-off-the-shelf systems,
dramatically increasing their vulnerability to EMP.

Priorities for Military EMP Hardening

Hardening the preponderance of fielded military forces
is not fiscally viable in an era of constrained budgets.
Therefore, the U.S. should focus on
building EMP protection into future systems
while retrofitting a subset of those already fielded.
The Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S.
from EMP Attack determined that
satellite navigation systems,
satellite and airborne intelligence and targeting systems,
communications infrastructure, and missile defense
are essential to U.S. success in regional conflicts. 74
Therefore, hardening efforts must ensure
adequate capability in these areas after an EMP attack.
In addition, the U.S. should harden
a small but lethal “EMP-proof” strike force
capable of exacting a high price
on those adversaries that choose to use EMP.

This force should include
tactical and strategic aircraft,
special operations forces,
and hardened support assets.
Civil infrastructure today is arguably
America’s greatest critical vulnerability
and represents an attractive target
for adversaries to use as a deterrent to
U.S. military engagement abroad.
Fortunately,
affordable means exist to reduce vulnerability
to acceptable levels within a few years,
and certainly by 2010. 75

Electricity and telecommunications infrastructures
should be protected first,
since all other critical infrastructures depend on them.
It would be impractical to EMP-harden
the entire electrical power system
due to the diverse range of
equipment and designs involved,
which makes the cost of retrofit prohibitive. 76
Therefore, the U.S. power system
would almost certainly experience
widespread blackouts following an HEMP attack.
Realizing this, protective measures should
focus on providing the quickest possible recovery
through hardening of critical nodes.
Efforts should prioritize identification and protection of
regional power generation necessary for recovery
and spares should be stockpiled
at coal-fired and hydroelectric plants,
which are resistant to EMP
and offer the best chance for rapid repair.
Other high-value and long-lead-time assets,
such as power transmission components,
should be protected at the system level,
and auxiliary power and hardened communications
must be made available at
centers responsible for restoration. 77
Telecommunications, like electrical power,
cannot realistically be comprehensively protected.
Hardening should focus on expanding capability of
current emergency communications systems
and identifying and protecting
high-leverage communications nodes.
For example, national security and
emergency preparedness telecommunications services (NS/EP),
already hardened against EMP,
should be upgraded to increase the number of possible users,
and should be monitored and tested
to ensure upgrades don’t introduce vulnerabilities.
At the same time, key network elements,
such as signal transfer points
and wireless home locator registers,
should be system-hardened against fast rise (E1) EMP,
and the general capability of the telecommunications system
to withstand sustained power failures
should be improved. 78

Training

Both military and civilian agencies need to start
integrating EMP scenarios into training exercises.
One of the immediate effects of an attack
would be loss of communications and situational awareness,
which could lead to paralyzing confusion
if not planned for and practiced.
In the near term,
training should emphasize response options for current fielded forces,
expanding on mitigation techniques proposed by Marine Major John CaJohn.

Maj CaJohn recommends forces develop standard procedures
to immediately restore communications
(using messengers or pyrotechnics if necessary),
use UHF instead of VHF radios, shut down and protect unneeded radios
for later use as backups, use small antennas, keep cable runs short,
run cables on the ground, shield critical components, ground all equipment,
and avoid use of commercial power
to decrease vulnerability to EMP. 79
In addition to practicing sound EMP protective measures,
combat and civil disaster response units
should start incorporating EMP scenarios
in major training exercises.
Red teams should identify portions of forces
notionally taken out by EMP
and deem them ineffective for portions of the exercise,
forcing blue forces to adapt.
Development of EMP-Resistant Manufacturing Standards
Legislated industry standards for
EMP protection of critical systems
could be the best way to address
the long-term EMP threat.
Although the U.S. military has long known the potential effects of EMP
and the small procurement costs to mitigate against it,
few systems have been hardened.
The civil sector is even less inclined to spend
extra money hardening against what is
characteristically a military threat.
Therefore, Congress should consider establishing and enforcing
EMP protection standards to compel compliance.

For example,
major infrastructure components
for electrical power and telecommunications
should be required to be “EMP compliant,”
as should most components of future military systems.
Such legislation would levy a small burden on industry today
but could make a huge contribution to America’s survival in the future.

Conclusion:

Electromagnetic pulse weapons represent
one of the most ominous threats
to U.S. national security in the near term
and offer potential adversaries
an attractive asymmetric attack option
to stymie U.S. expeditionary operations.

Both nuclear and non-nuclear EMP technologies
are proliferating
and threaten U.S. operations in different ways
and at different levels.
In light of the emerging threats,
it is clear that the United States should respond with
a coordinated diplomatic, military, and civilian effort
that addresses the most likely
and most catastrophic EMP scenarios.
The response should include a formal mandate
classifying high-power nuclear EMP weapons as WMD,
recursive hardening of critical expeditionary capabilities,
near-term establishment of a credible EMP-hardened strike force,
hardening critical components of the civilian infrastructure,
large-scale military and civilian EMP response training,
and legislated EMP hardness requirements for
future military and civilian systems.
A coordinated response can protect America’s
electronic Achilles’ heel from EMP,
ensure effectiveness of its military forces,
and help guarantee viability of U.S. society for years to come.

Notes

1
George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: White House, 2002), 1.
2
Ibid, 15.
3
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 17-18.
4
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2003), 1.
5
A.K. Cebrowski, The Implementation of Network-centric Warfare (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2005), 4.
6
Richard D. Winters, "Power Supply Voltage Transient Analysis & Protection"
(paper presented at the Powercon III, Power Conversion Conference, Tempe AZ, 1976).
http://ieeexplore.org.
7
Dennis Bodson, "Electromagnetic Pulse and the Radio Amateur," QST 70, no. 8 (August 1986), 19.
8
Winters, "Power Supply Voltage Transient Analysis & Protection.'"
Available from http://ieeexplore.org .
9
Eileen M. Walling, "High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications for Warfare,"
(Maxwell AFB AL: Air University, 2000), 4.
10
Carlo Kopp, "The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction,"
(Fairbairn, Australia: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, 1996), 2. Available
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/kopp/apjemp.html.
11
House Military Research & Development Subcommittee,
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure,
Statement of Dr. Lowell Wood, July 16, 1997, 63. Available from
http://commdocs.house.gove/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_Of.htm.
12
Major M. CaJohn, "Electromagnetic Pulse: From Chaos to a Manageable Solution,"
(Quantico VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1988), 6.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1988/CM2.htm.
13
Kopp, "The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction," 9.
14
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure, 14.
15
Walling, "High Power Microwaves," 4-8.
16
Jack Spencer, "America's Vulnerability to a Different Nuclear Threat:
An Electromagnetic Pulse," Backgrounder 1372
(Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 26 May 2000), 1.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/bg1372.htm.
17
Dr. J. S. Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States
from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, (Washington DC: U.S. Congress, 2004), 4.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/2004_r/04-07-22emp.pdf.
18
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
The Military Critical Technologies List Part II:
Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998), II-6-28.
http://www.wetp.org/Wetp/public/dwlds/HASL_271dnlfile.PDF

Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 5.
20
Ibid., 5-6.
21
Ibid., 6.
22
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure,
Statement of Dr. George W. Ullrich, 21.
23
Dr. Bruce C. Gabrielson, "An Introduction to the EMP and Lightning Threat,"
in EMC Expo 87 (San Diego, CA: Sachs/Freeman Associates, Inc., 1987).
http://molasar.blackmagic.com/ses/bruceg/EMC/EMP-Light.html
24
The Military Critical Technologies List Part II: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technologies, II-6-4.
25
CDI, "Nuclear Facts at a Glance," (Center for Defense Information, 4 February 2003).
http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/facts-at-a-glance.cfm.
26
Dr. Jane Orient, "The Really Big Threats," Civil Defense Perspectives 18, no. 6 (September 2002), 1.
http://www.oism.org/cdp/sept2002.htm
27
Walling, "High Power Microwaves," 1.
28
Ibid.
29
AFRL, "High Power Microwave Fact Sheet," (Kirtland AFB: Air Force Research Laboratory, 2002).
30
Ibid.
31
Walling, "High Power Microwaves," 4. Field strength calculated using free air impedance of 377 ohms, [V/m = Sqr(377*W/m2)]
32
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure, 63.
33
Walling, "High Power Microwaves," 4.
34
Ibid., 22.
35
Kopp, "The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction," 3.
36
Ibid., 5. Field strength calculated assuming an energy output of 20
MegaJoules, pulse width of 200 microseconds, isotropic antenna pattern, and free air impedance of 377 ohms.
37
D. V. Giri, "Electromagnetic Sources and Threats to Civilian Systems," IEEE, 2003.
http://www.geml.uni-hannover.de/ieee/events/emv2003/Aushang_Giri_ro.pdf
38
Kopp, “The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of Mass Destruction,” 6.
39
Jim Wilson, "E-Bombs and Terrorists," Popular Mechanics 178, no. 9 (September 2001), 51.
40
Kopp, "The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction," 18.
41
Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, Statement of Dr. Ira W. Merritt, 25 February 1998, 3.
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/senate/merritt.htm
42
Walling, "High Power Microwaves, " 4; Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse
to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure, 63.
43
David Isenberg, "Taiwan Defense: Finger on the 'Enter' Key," Asia Times
Online, 14 August 2002. Available from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/DH14Ad04.html
40844
Ibid.
Taiwan Relations Act. US Code Title 22, Chapter 48, Section 3301,
subsection (b) (6), 10 April 1979.
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm.
46
Thomas B. Fargo, "Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Defense Strategy," Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002, Issue 32, 12.
47
Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Chinese Ballistic Missiles," 1999.
http://cns.miis.edu/research/China/coxrep/wbmdat.htm
48
CIA, CIA World Fact Book (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005).
odci.gov/cia ...ks.html
49
Han Ho Suk, "North Korea's War Strategy of Massive Retaliations against US Attacks,"
Center for Korean Affairs, 24 April 2003, entire article but especially 5-7, 9-10.
http://resistance.chiffonrouge.org/article.php3?id_article=189
50
John Pike, "Republic of Korea Military Guide," 2002.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/index.html
51
Suk, "North Korea's War Strategy of Massive Retaliations," 1.
52
Ibid., 7.
53
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure,
Statement of Dr. Lowell Wood, 63, 74.
54
Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States
from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 27.
55
Spencer, "America's Vulnerability to a Different Nuclear Threat: An Electromagnetic Pulse," 5.
56
Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States
from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, v (abstract).
57
Paul M. Weyrick, "Electromagnetic Pulse: An Avoidable Disaster,"
Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 3 January 2005.
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/weyrich/050103
58
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure, 84.
59
Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 1, 8.
60
New York Independent System Operator, Interim Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout,
(New York, NY: New York Independent System Operator, 2004), 4.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/NYISO.blackout.report.8.Jan.04.pdf
61
J. Peter Lark, "Report on August 14th Blackout," Michigan Public Service Commission, 2003, 1.
http://www.michigan.gove/mpsc/0,1607,7-159-16370_17060-80766--,00.html
62
Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 6.
63
Ibid., 24.
64
Ibid., 25.
65
Ibid., 25-27.
66
Ibid., 35.
67
Ibid., 36.
68
Ibid., 37.
69
Ibid., 31.
45
"Federal Reserve Board Sponsorship for Priority Telecommunications Services of Organizations
That Are Important to National Security/Emergency Preparedness,"
Federal Register 67, no. 236 (9 December 2002), 72958.
http://www.occ.treas.gov/fr/federalreister/67fr72958.pdf
71
Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 43.
72
Threats Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse to U.S. Military Systems and Civilian Infrastructure, 23.
73
CaJohn, "Electromagnetic Pulse-from Chaos to a Manageable Solution," 8.
74
Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 48.
75
Ibid., 11.
76
Ibid., 20.
77
Ibid., 21-22.
78
Ibid., 29.
79
CaJohn, "Electromagnetic Pulse-from Chaos to a Manageable Solution," 15- 16.