Showing posts with label Xen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Xen. Show all posts

2014-03-01

#privacy not the purpose of #Qubes

2.17: co.cyb/sec/qubes/privacy not the purpose of qubes,
[3.1: intro:
. the Qubes project provides sure isolation
with a hardening of the hypervisor Xen;
you can have several virtual machines (vm) at once
and can safely run a web browser in one vm
knowing it will not infect your other vm's .]

Peter Chin Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 6:06 AM
Re: [qubes-devel] Digest for qubes-devel@googlegroups.com
This entire project is a total useless waste of time.
Please do due diligence in your research
about all threat levels that actually exist:
The very first compilers that were
created for the design of computers
were already compromised by the time they were used to
compile code for designing even rudimentary computers

2013-12-31

Dell Latitude E6430 #QubesOS #xen #security&freedom

12.31: summary:
. I feel secure on Chromebook with its verified boot;
but that is very limited in what it can do .
. the Qubes OS provides virtualization of linux
that is needed to isolate computer activities
into separate linux virtual machines .
. by providing this "security by isolation"
your web surfing of unsafe sites
can't be exploited to steal your bank's password
because they run on virtually separate machines .
. there is an hcl (hardware compatibility list)
to help you find a computer that Qubes works with;
and it says a Dell Latitude E6430 does work,
but doesn't work out-of-the-box
(it needs some sort of unspecified "tweaking").

2013-11-30

#badBIOS @dragosr vs Mac, Linux and PC

4: cyb/sec/#badBIOS/ 
30: summary:
. malware that spreads via usb devices
can infect other usb devices,
and the problem is not the os;
it is the hardware and usb standards
which expose the os to malware infection .
. Dragos Ruiu talks about a mac infection
which sounds like the one I got;
it prevented me from reinstalling the os;
and it started infecting my chromebook,
but the chrome os was able to clean it up .
. my 2005 ubuntu laptop was not so lucky .
. a laptop in my future that will likely do well
is one running the xen hypervisor,
hardened with the Qubes OS .
(see #Qubes #Xen vs Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS).

#Qubes #Xen vs Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS

6: co.cyb/sec/qubes/Xen vs Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS:
me to qubes-devel 5:41am:
. reading about the #badBIOS infection,
blog.erratasec.com/2013/10/badbios-features-explained.html
I was surprised to learn that all computing accessories
(mouse, trackpad, hub, keyboard, and of course
 flash drives) could have a software-programmable firmware
and this could be infected with malware that could spread
to your next computer if attached to dom0 .
. I was also concerned that a new flash drive malware
-- Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS --
could infect a next machine without even being mounted;
is this a new threat that xen has yet to adapt to?