#cyber #security @rootkovska #qubes vs @Bruce_Schneier @schneierblog

11.22: co.wired.com/cyb/sec/qubes/
comments @ wired.com/2014/11/protection-from-hackers/
in defense of qubes

#privacy not the purpose of #Qubes

2.17: co.cyb/sec/qubes/privacy not the purpose of qubes,
[3.1: intro:
. the Qubes project provides sure isolation
with a hardening of the hypervisor Xen;
you can have several virtual machines (vm) at once
and can safely run a web browser in one vm
knowing it will not infect your other vm's .]

Peter Chin Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 6:06 AM
Re: [qubes-devel] Digest for qubes-devel@googlegroups.com

This entire project is a total useless waste of time.
Please do due diligence in your research
about all threat levels that actually exist:
The very first compilers that were
created for the design of computers
were already compromised by the time they were used to
compile code for designing even rudimentary computers

Dell Latitude E6430 #QubesOS #xen #security&freedom

12.31: summary:
. I feel secure on Chromebook with its verified boot;
but that is very limited in what it can do .
. the Qubes OS provides virtualization of linux
that is needed to isolate computer activities
into separate linux virtual machines .
. by providing this "security by isolation"
your web surfing of unsafe sites
can't be exploited to steal your bank's password
because they run on virtually separate machines .
. there is an hcl (hardware compatibility list)
to help you find a computer that Qubes works with;
and it says a Dell Latitude E6430 does work,
but doesn't work out-of-the-box
(it needs some sort of unspecified "tweaking").

#badBIOS @dragosr vs Mac, Linux and PC

4: cyb/sec/#badBIOS/ 
30: summary:
. malware that spreads via usb devices
can infect other usb devices,
and the problem is not the os;
it is the hardware and usb standards
which expose the os to malware infection .
. Dragos Ruiu talks about a mac infection
which sounds like the one I got;
it prevented me from reinstalling the os;
and it started infecting my chromebook,
but the chrome os was able to clean it up .
. my 2005 ubuntu laptop was not so lucky .
. a laptop in my future that will likely do well
is one running the xen hypervisor,
hardened with the Qubes OS .
(see #Qubes #Xen vs Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS).

#Qubes #Xen vs Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS

6: co.cyb/sec/qubes/Xen vs Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS:
me to qubes-devel 5:41am:

. reading about the #badBIOS infection,
blog.erratasec.com/2013/10/badbios-features-explained.html
I was surprised to learn that all computing accessories
(mouse, trackpad, hub, keyboard, and of course
 flash drives) could have a software-programmable firmware
and this could be infected with malware that could spread
to your next computer if attached to dom0 .
. I was also concerned that a new flash drive malware
-- Dragos Ruiu's #badBIOS --
could infect a next machine without even being mounted;
is this a new threat that xen has yet to adapt to?